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The was an economic bubble in Japan from 1986 to 1991 in which real estate and stock market prices were greatly inflated. The bubble was characterized by rapid acceleration of asset prices and overheated economic activity, as well as an uncontrolled money supply and credit expansion.〔Kunio Okina, Masaaki Shirakawa, and Shigenori Shiratsuka (February 2001):The Asset Price Bubble and Monetary Policy: Japan’s Experience in the Late 1980s and the Lessons〕 More specifically, over-confidence and telemetry speculation regarding asset and stock prices had been closely associated with excessive monetary easing policy at the time.〔Edgardo Demaestri, Pietro Masci (2003): Financial Crises in Japan and Latin America, Inter-American Development Bank〕 By August 1990, the Nikkei stock index had plummeted to half its peak by the time of the fifth monetary tightening by the Bank of Japan (also known as BOJ).〔 By late 1991, the asset price began to fall. Even though the asset price had visibly collapsed by early 1992,〔 the economy's decline continued for more than a decade. This decline resulted in a huge accumulation of non-performing assets loans (NPL), causing difficulties for many financial institutions. The bursting of the Japanese asset price bubble contributed to what many call the Lost Decade.〔http://fhayashi.fc2web.com/Prescott1/Postscript_2003/hayashi-prescott.pdf〕 == Background == Early research has found that the rapid increase in Japanese asset prices was largely due to the delayed action by the BOJ to address the issue. At the end of August 1987, the BOJ signaled the possibility of tightening the monetary policy, but decided to delay the decision in view of economic uncertainty related to Black Monday (October 19, 1987) in the US.〔Research and Statistics Department, Bank of Japan, April 1987b, Jousei Handan Shiryo: 62-nen Haru (Quarterly Economic Outlook: Spring 1987),” Chousa Geppo (Monthly Bulletin)(in Japanese)〕 More recent research supports an alternate view, that BOJ reluctance to tighten the monetary policy was in spite of the fact that the economy went into expansion in the second half of 1987. The Japanese economy had just recovered from the , which occurred from 1985—1986.〔 The “endaka recession” has been closely linked to the Plaza Accord of September 1985, which led to the strong appreciation of the Japanese yen.〔Mieno, Yasushi, (2000) Ri wo Mite Gi wo Omou (Recall Faith to See What Makes a Profit), Chuo Koronsha,(in Japanese)〕 The strong appreciation of the yen, however, eroded the Japanese economy since the economy was led by exports and capital investment for export purpose. In fact, in order to overcome the “endaka” recession and stimulate the local economy, an aggressive fiscal policy was adopted, mainly through expansion of public investment.〔 Simultaneously, the BOJ declared that curbing the yen’s appreciation was a “national priority”.〔〔Ohta, Takeshi (1991)Kokusai Kin’yu—Genba Kara no Shougen (International Finance—Witness Concerned),Chuko Shinsho (in Japanese)〕 To prevent the yen from appreciating further, monetary policy makers pursued aggressive monetary easing and slashed the official discount rate to as low as 2.5% by February 1987.〔 The move clearly to curb further appreciation of the yen, appreciating from 200.05 ¥/U$ (first round monetary easing) to 128.25 ¥/U$ (end of 1987). The course only reversed by the spring of 1988, when the US dollar began to strengthen against the yen. Some researchers have pointed out that "with exception of the first discount rate cut, the subsequent four are heavily influenced by the US: () second and the third cut was a joint announcement to cut the discount rate while the fourth and fifth was due to () joint statement () either Japan-US or the G-7".〔〔 It has been suggested that the US exerted influence to increase the strength of the yen, which would help with the ongoing attempts to reduce the US-Japan current account deficit.〔 Almost all discount rate cuts announced by the BOJ explicitly expressed the need to stabilize the foreign exchange rate, rather than to stabilize the domestic economy.〔 Later, BOJ hinted at the possibility of tightening the policy due to inflationary pressures within the domestic economy. Despite leaving the official discount rate unchanged during the summer of 1987, the BOJ had expressed concern over excessive monetary easing, particularly after the money supply and asset prices rose sharply.〔 Nonetheless, Black Monday in the US triggered a delay for the BOJ to switch to a monetary tightening policy. The BOJ officially increased the discount rate on March 31, 1989.〔 The table below demonstrates the monthly average of the U.S. dollar/Yen spot rate (Yen per USD) at 17:00 JST.〔Bank of Japan: (US.Dollar/Yen Spot Rate at 17:00 in JST, Average in the Month, Tokyo Market ) for duration January 1980 ~ September 2010. Retrieved February 24, 2013〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Japanese asset price bubble」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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